One might have expected the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry to be disproportionately effected by the Great Depression of the 1930s. After all canned pineapple was not a basic foodstuff like bread or milk. Indeed the pineapple industry did experience an implosion of demand from late 1931. In common with continental U.S. canners the Hawaiian canners had huge quantities of unsold produce and experienced a collapse in the price of their products. The problem facing the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry was perhaps greater than that facing the continental U.S. fruit canning industry because during the boom of the 1920s the industry had invested heavily in increased capacity. This was especially the case at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. whose president, James D. Dole, had purchased the Island of Lanai, where he developed the largest pineapple plantation in the world.

Initially the industry appeared to have escaped the immediate impact of the depression. Output of canned pineapple rose from 9.2 million cases in 1929 to 12.7 million in 1930 and then stabilised at 12.8 million in 1931, as can be seen in Figure 1. The wholesale price per dozen 2½ cans also held up well peaking at $2.2 between July 1929 and June 1930 and then falling back to $1.95 by March 1931, as can be seen in Figure 2. It was in 1931 that the full impact of the depression struck the industry. Between 1931 and 1932 the production of canned pineapple fell by 60 per cent from 12.8 million cases to 5.1 million cases and the wholesale price fell to a low of $1.20 in December 1931. There were already warning signs before the close of 1930 that the pineapple industry was on course for an extremely turbulent period.
The wholesale price of canned pineapple had peaked in 1929. By mid-1931, inventories were rising at an alarming rate, and the pineapple canners decided to curtail production. Lower grade fruits were discarded and only the best quality fruits were canned. It was estimated that only 75 per cent of the 1931 crop was harvested. The fall in canned pineapple production was much greater than the fall in the per capita consumption of all canned fruits in the continental U.S., which in 1932 was only 20 per cent down on the peak in consumption of 12.8 pounds in 1930.¹

Figure 1: Hawaiian Canned Pineapple Production, 1929-41


The pineapple canners began to come under severe financial pressure, especially the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which had undertaken an ambitious expansion program in the 1920s. They had begun to cut prices the previous year. In July 1930, prices were cut by 16.5 per cent below those of 1929. In April 1931 they were cut to 24 per cent. Late in October 1931, following the lead of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., the

¹ U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
Hawaiian canners made further drastic cuts in prices, they were cut to 42.5 per cent below those of 1929. Prices were now at their lowest level in the history of the industry. Yet these reductions failed to achieve their objective, and there was a large carry-over into 1932. The industry was now marketing its output far below the costs of production, and this had a devastating effect on the weaker members of the industry. Two of the minor canners went bankrupt, and one of the three major canners also became a casualty of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In October 1932 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which was heavily in debt, was reorganised and acquired by the sugar factor, Castle & Cooke. Dole was removed from effective control of the reorganized company.

Figure 2: Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Pineapple and Cling Peaches Per Dozen No.2.5 Cans f.o.b. California, 1931-41

Although the reorganization of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in 1932 temporarily solved the problem of over-production, the appalling over-production in the pineapple industry had led to a strong movement towards the organization of an agricultural cooperative association to bring the supply back into equilibrium with the demand for canned pineapple. After long, and protracted negotiations in mid-1932, seven of the canners agreed on August 30, 1932 to set up a non-profit making organization, the Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association (PPCA) to curtail production. There is no doubt that the failure of the Californian peach curtailment plan, which increased the possibility of a heavy supply of canned peaches, helped win over the waiverers. Production was limited to 5.3 million cases in 1932, in the hope that this would effectively eliminate the stocks in the warehouses by the beginning of the new season of 1933. Only top grade pineapples were canned. At the same time many thousands of inferior grade pineapples were left to rot in the fields, and the planting of new areas was restricted. The difficulties experienced at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which only produced 850,000 cases that year, meant that the target was easily met. The total

---

6 EMBCDFN, Vol.2, No.5, September 1932, p.17.
pack was just over 5 million cases, and most of the accumulated stocks in the warehouses were sold.\(^7\)

The PPCA did not restrict itself to the curtailment of production. It also sought to stimulate demand by advertising their product in the continental United States. This old and well proven policy had first been adopted by the pineapple industry in 1908. In November 1932, the PPCA's Advertising Committee completed plans for the launch of an aggressive advertising campaign costing $1 million. It was one of the largest advertising campaigns launched on a single food product up to that time. JWT was appointed to handle the campaign.

After a thorough analysis of all the available media, the Committee decided to use leading women's magazines to spearhead the campaign. The five chosen, together with the *Saturday Evening Post*, had a combined monthly circulation of 18 million households. In common with canners in the continental U.S. the Hawaiian pineapple canners were also able to revive demand by taking advantage of a reducing diets craze. It affected the main consumers of its product and those of its new product, canned pineapple juice, that is to say the American middle class. This was reflected in the canned pineapple industry advertising from 1932 that claimed for example that canned pineapple was a source of vitamins hence it was good for you. Harvey Levenstein has referred to a 'vitamin-mania' in the 1930s. The magazines in which

the pineapple canners advertised assured their readers that the scientific claims made by the canned food industry were true.⁸

The *Saturday Evening Post* was an important supplementary medium in homes receiving one or more of the women's magazines, and a medium of great independent value too. In these homes the *Post* increased the advertising's readership; it added to the number of advertising impressions per month, and because a pineapple advertisement in the *Post* might frequently be seen when it was overlooked in the women's magazines, the *Post* had the further value of expanding the number of prospects created by the advertising in any one month. Moreover the *Post*'s high readership per copy of both men and women gave it special value in reaching both sexes, especially men. The *Post* also had a great influence on American culture. Over a period of many years it had influenced the selection of advertised goods. As a food medium the *Post* exceeded every other general magazine except the *Ladies' Home Journal* in amount of advertising investment. It was found on the lists of most of the leading food advertisers.

An intensive campaign was also carried in daily newspapers in 75 of the larger metropolitan centres, with a combined circulation of 12 million households. In addition, full page and 1,000 line insertions were carried in the *American Weekly* with a circulation of 5 million households, a market of some 20 million people. The *American Weekly* was distributed with the Sunday editions of the 17 metropolitan newspapers published by William Randolph Hearst. Nutritional and

---

professional cookery, domestic science and hospital publications were also used. Trade journal displays were sent to wholesale and retail outlets, including grocers, confectioners, soda fountains, hotels, bakeries and hospitals. The nationwide campaign was inaugurated on November 19, 1932 with a double page display in the *Saturday Evening Post*. The campaign slogan was 'follow the newest dietetic advice - start or end one meal a day with canned pineapple.'

Illustration 1 provides an example of a PPCA advertisement.

The campaign was aimed at the upper segment of the American market for food products. It had been found in the past that only half of the 25 million white American households were consistent purchasers of packaged food products. Repeated surveys by JWT had shown that this 50 per cent were responsible for purchasing between 75 and 80 per cent of the supply of quality foods. JWT targeted concentrated groups of these people, living near the best shops, buying profit-carrying goods when it chose the magazines. Magazine readers, those whose budgets still allowed magazines, tended to be conservative. JWT argued that although these readers were slower to respond, once they accepted the product, they embraced it permanently. All of the PPCA’s advertising was concentrated on these known purchasers.

---


10 University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1932-33 Advertising Campaign, No.8, April 3, 1933, p.1.
JWT also persuaded some of its other clients to collaborate with the PPCA campaign after it was launched. The most important of these was the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., owner of one of the largest groups of chain stores in the United States, the A & P stores. Chain stores had attracted a growing proportion of retail sales in the 1920s. The A & P stores agreed to coordinate their own advertising with that of the PPCA.\[11\]

By the beginning of 1933 there was clear evidence of a revival in demand and sales. In late January a second wave of national advertising was launched. By the beginning of March 1933 evidence had emerged which suggested that the recovery in sales was strongest in the chain store sector of the retail trade.\[12\] In late April 1933, a third wave of the campaign was launched. A large part of the sales effort was concentrated upon leading American chain store groups such as A & P, Piggly Wiggly and Safeway. This wave was begun by the distribution of display material by thousands of chain store and independent retail outlets to facilitate floor and counter displays.\[13\] This campaign finished in July 1933, with generally satisfactory results.

The carry-over of unsold products in Hawaiian warehouses on June 20, 1933, was estimated at under two million cases, the smallest total for several years.\[14\]

\[11\]University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.3, December 22, 1932, p.4.
\[12\]Honolulu Star-Bulletin, February 24, 1933, pp.1, 3; University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.4, January 10, 1933, p.1; Western Canner & Packer, Vol.24, No.10, February 1933, p.30; University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.6, March 1, 1933, p.1; Western Canner & Packer, Vol.25, No.1, May 1933, p.30.
\[13\]University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.9, April 19, 1933, p.1; Western Canner & Packer, Vol.25, No.1, May 1933, p.30.
At first the PPCA was principally concerned with the limitation of production and advertising. However, some of the members of the PPCA soon decided that a more comprehensive marketing agreement should be carried out. In July 1933, a new cooperative agreement was drawn up and accepted by all the members. It created a production pool. Once again events in California dictated policy in Hawaii. An agreement on the restriction of the canned peach pack to 10 million cases had been adopted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.\footnote{\textit{Western Canner & Packer}, Vol.25, No.3, July 1933, p.30; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, \textit{Labor in the Territory of Hawaii, 1939}, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1940, p.85.}

In 1933 the pack quota was set at 8 million cases. Production for that year recovered somewhat to 7.8 million cases. The carry-over at the end of the pack year on May 31, 1934, was just over a million cases. On November 13, 1933, the PPCA launched a new advertising campaign. As in their initial sales campaign launched the previous year, the PPCA's advertising was based upon the newly discovered 'vitamins' present in pineapple, with authoritative advice to eat canned pineapple every day. In addition, the advertising copy personalized the "Pineapple for Health" message by including portraits of healthy people and presenting evidence that 'vitamins' contribute to physical fitness. JWT had begun this temporary fashion of advertising nationally distributed brand foods as having medicinal value for genuine or imagined afflictions in 1925 with a campaign for Velveeta processed cheese.\footnote{\textit{Western Canner & Packer}, Vol.25, No.4, August 1933, p.24; \textit{EMBCDFN}, Vol.4, No.3, July 1934, p.20; \textit{Western Canner & Packer}, Vol.25, No.7, November 1933, p.28; Otis Pease, \textit{The Responsibilities of American Advertising: Private Control and Public Influence, 1920-1940}, New Haven, Yale U.P., 1958, pp.94-5; Duke University, John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising & Marketing History, J. Walter...}
In May 1934, the PPCA's Advertising Committee inaugurated a summer advertising campaign for canned pineapples. The theme was built around the slogan "Canned pineapple for Summer Energy". JWT with a reduced budget had become more selective in its choice of advertising media, concentrating even more on specific areas, principally the major metropolitan centres. Advertising was carried in the American Weekly as before. Thirty-nine daily newspapers in 33 cities, purchased by over 5.8 million households, were chosen by JWT for full colour page advertising. Outdoor hoardings were also used in 44 metropolitan centres which were seen by an estimated 73 million people. Once again, the A & P stores worked together with the PPCA campaign. This advertising helped restore continental U.S. sales to 1931 levels. Indeed in 1934, shipments to the continental U.S. reached 12 million cases, a level in excess of the previous all-time record of 1931, although in value terms the 1931 level was not attained.

In September 1935, the PPCA assumed direct administrative control of cooperative advertising for the industry, which had hitherto been conducted by a group advertising committee representing the participating members. In previous contracts, JWT had insisted on separate contracts with each of the producers and had reserved to itself the right to prepare all copy for publication, stressing whatever its staff considered the best selling points. The result was that the text of some of the

Thompson Archives, Marketing Research Reports, Reel 197, The Nutritional Value of Canned Pineapple, March 1933.
advertisements went beyond what the canners considered truth in advertising. The contract reserved to the PPCA the sole right to decide the lines to be followed and the qualities to be stressed by the copy writers and artists. The advertising was handled by a different agency, McCann Erickson Inc. During the depression, the advertising agencies engaged in cut-throat competition. So the PPCA's switch to another agency was not out of the ordinary.  

In October, the PPCA launched a big advertising campaign with full colour advertisements in leading consumer publications calculated to reach practically every potential consumer in the United States. This was followed by another campaign during 1936-7, which led to what in many respects was the PPCA's "most successful year" since its foundation. In 1937, the production of 12.3 million cases almost matched the previous pack of 12.8 million cases in 1931. At the same time receipts from sales of canned pineapple to the continental U.S. reached the record level of $42.7 million.

However, after the change in the direction of federal government economic policy in 1937, there was a sharp setback in business conditions in the continental U.S. the following year. In 1938, production was cut to 10.5 million cases despite the rise in the retail price in 1937, shipments fell to 8.3 million cases, and receipts plummeted to $24.6 million, a fall of $18.1 million from the record of the previous

---

20 Western Canner & Packer, Vol.27, No.5, September 1935, p.5.
The wholesale price was cut by 20¢ from $1.85 to $1.65 in June 1938, and the advertising campaign was continued by the PPCA until 1942. The work of the PPCA helped to bring about a recovery in continental U.S. demand for canned pineapple.

Although the PPCA was responsible for part of the success of the Hawaiian pineapple industry in the 1930s, another crucial factor behind this success was the development of a new product, pineapple juice. It was a good example of product life stretching for an industry in the third stage of the product life cycle. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. made the scientific breakthrough necessary for the production of clarified pineapple juice in 1932. The commercial exploitation of the scientific breakthrough at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. came in a period when there was a substantial and growing demand for non-alcoholic beverages in the United States. Before the 1930s almost all non-alcoholic beverages consumed in the United States took the form of soft drinks. However, in the 1930s, the growing health consciousness of many American consumers led a considerable number to switch to drinks made from pure fruit juices. Between 1933 and 1941, the annual per capita consumption of fruit juices rose from 0.5 pounds in 1933 to 8.5 pounds in 1941.

---

23 PPCA Analysis 1939, p.33; see Figure 2.
The remarkable growth of the American fruit juice industry appears to contradict all that is known about this decade.

The Hawaiian pineapple juice industry was given a major boost by the problem which had led to the formation of the PPCA, that is the overproduction of fresh pineapples. The self imposed restrictions on output were rigidly adhered to by the Hawaiian pineapple industry, especially after the pooling agreement of 1934. Hence the pineapple producers turned to the production of canned pineapple juice, which was unregulated, as an alternative way of making use of their surplus pineapples.\(^\text{28}\)

\[\text{Figure 3: Production of Canned Hawaiian Pineapple and American Grapefruit Juice, 1933-41}\]

Series 1 = Pineapple Juice  
Series 2 = Grapefruit Juice


\[\text{Imperial Economic Committee, A Survey of the Trade in Canned Fruit, London, H.M.S.O., 1939, p.48.}\]
The growth of the pineapple juice industry between 1933 and 1941 was noteworthy, as can be seen in Figure 3. The growth in production was similar to that of a close substitute produced mainly in Florida, grapefruit juice,29 as can also be seen in Figure 3. Receipts also showed a similar pattern in this period, although pineapple juice was only worth about half as much per case as canned pineapple. They grew from a mere $1,000 in 1933 to $21.3 million in 1941.30

The new product was featured prominently in the individual advertising campaigns of the Hawaiian pineapple producers. Libby began a campaign in the Midwest in August 1933, which tied in with extensive distribution and sampling carried on at the Century of Progress Exposition held in Chicago that year.31 Libby was to invest heavily in fruit juice production, both in Hawaii and in the Far Western States.32 Libby advertised pineapple juice on a regular basis from 1933. Illustration 2 provides an early example of a Libby advertisement. It focuses on the alleged health benefits of the new product.

Pineapple juice played a central role in the recovery of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., because pineapple juice was not included in the cooperative marketing agreement with the PPCA. In 1933 the company had a serious problem, for although it had become the world's largest individual producer of canned pineapple, it did not have an established brand label unlike Libby and the California Packing Corporation. It

29 Tin, October 1934, pp.6-9.
32 Survey No.11, p.28.
produced almost entirely for the private brand label market. There were considerable risks in this. First, there was no consumer acceptance of the company's products by name, and therefore the company's market could be eliminated overnight, if brokers, wholesalers, and retailers had the inclination. Second, the prospects for growth were limited in the private brand market. In August 1930 Michael J. Cullen had founded the first supermarket and begun what Richard S. Tedlow has called the 'supermarket revolution'. Supermarkets were to rely on the consumers' recognition of branded and nationally advertised products as opposed to private labels to stimulate business. Indeed Cullen did not stock any private brands.

Nonetheless the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had to be very careful if it wished to establish its own 'Dole' brand label. In the early 1930s it could not afford to alienate the private brand buyers, by promoting the 'Dole' brand in competition with them. Indeed the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 eliminated the chain stores’ advantage over other retailers. Most of the large chain store groups began to promote their own private brands on which they could make more profit, for example in the case of A & P, ‘A & P’ (choice grade) and ‘Iona’ (standard grade). The chain stores did not abandon manufacturers’ brands completely. In the case of California Packing Corporation’s ‘Del Monte’ brand, chain store purchases still accounted for about one-third of output in 1938, and A & P remained California Packing Corporation’s biggest

However, in retrospect, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.'s caution proved to be more than justified.

In collaboration with the New York advertising agency, N.W. Ayer & Son, the company decided to use canned pineapple juice as the main focus of its national advertising campaign to establish the Dole brand, because no obligations were entailed in this new product. The campaign was launched in March 1933 initially using the company's 'Diamond Head' brand, but featuring the Dole name prominently on the label. By October the 'Diamond Head' brand had been replaced by the 'Dole' brand as can be seen in Illustration 3. The campaign was at first confined to colour advertisements in national magazines in the United States. The company's advertising budget averaged from $200,000 to $500,000 a year, or more, especially during the introduction period for pineapple juice. In 1936, for example, the company spent nearly $366,000 on advertising.

Initially the motif of the advertisements was the provision of information about Dole pineapple juice, as can be seen in Illustrations 3 and 4 which are examples of advertisements from 1934 and 1935. However, from 1935 Ayer began to use modern art to emphasize the attraction of pineapple juice. Ayer sought through its advertising campaign to associate canned pineapple closely with a 'romantic' image of Hawaii. In common with the PPCA, Libby and the California Packing Corporation, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. tried to associate its product with an exotic image of the islands where it was produced. At this time travel to Hawaii from the continental United States was

---

34 Fortune, Vol.18, No.11, November 1938, p.104.
very expensive and only the rich could afford a holiday in Hawaii. So the
advertisements drew upon the imagery of Hollywood fantasy such as King Vidor’s
1932 movie ‘Bird of Paradise, which featured Dolores Del Rio. 'Atmosphere
advertising' was a style of advertising which had been devised in the 1910s.
According to Stephen Fox it made its pitch obliquely, by suggestion or association.

Ayer used romantic images of Hawaii to sell canned pineapple. The advertising
had several different motifs. First, Hawaii was presented as an exotic vacation
destination. Illustrations 5 and 6 provide good examples of advertisements from 1935
and 1936. Second, Ayer sought to associate pineapple juice with Hawaii’s native
people using images evoking their life and culture before white settlement.
Illustrations 7, 8 and 9 show advertisements from 1936 and 1938. Third, Ayer sought
to appeal to health conscious consumers by stressing the alleged health benefits of the
product. Illustrations 8 and 10 provide good examples. The former is an example of
advertising directed at medical practitioners in medical journals. Fourth, Ayer
appealed to children through a cartoon character that became known as ‘Johnny
Pineapple’ as can be seen in illustrations 10 and 11.

In common with the iconic advertising campaign undertaken by Royal Dutch
Shell in Britain during the same period leading contemporary artists were employed.
Charles T. Coiner, one of Ayer’s art directors, commissioned artists such as Pierre
Roy, Georgia O’Keeffe, Millard Sheets and A.M. Cassandre to create illustrations in
the late 1930s. Cassandre, for example, had created a famous poster in 1935 for the
Normandie transatlantic passenger liner. Later, Pierre Roy, the French modern artist,

visited Hawaii in spring 1939 and spent nearly two months painting for the company. Examples of the work of Cassandre and Sheets can be seen in Illustrations 12, 13 and 14.

Not all of the commissions were a success. O’Keeffe was commissioned by Aye to produce two new paintings for the pineapple juice advertising. In order to capture the atmosphere of the pineapple plantations she wanted to stay onsite in the plantation labourers’ housing during her visit to Hawaii in 1939. The company would not allow this because it would have undermined the company’s strict labour hierarchy. As a result O’Keeffe felt unable to paint pineapples although she painted other plants during her visit. An example of an O’Keeffe advertisement can be seen in Illustration 15.

Ayer also made use of colour photographs for a series of advertisements appearing in national magazines from January 1939. Grancel Fitz of New York, the Hungarian émigré, Martin Munkacsi, and the Australian commercial photographer, Anton Bruehl, were commissioned to take the photographs for the advertisements, which like the artwork, stressed Hawaiian atmosphere. An example of a Bruehl advertisement can be seen in Illustration 16.

The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the first Hawaiian company to undertake a radio advertising campaign, reviving a plan first devised by James D. Dole in 1931. He had advocated radio advertising shortly before his overthrow after a pilot radio advertising campaign for Dole pineapple in the New York metropolitan area. However, his plan for a national radio advertising campaign after his overthrow. Radio advertising in the United States had begun in the early 1920s. However, until the 1930s, it was believed that homemakers had no time to listen to daytime radio. But nonetheless, daytime shows sponsored by food manufacturers can be traced back to the early 1930s. Young & Rubicam (Y&R), one of the United States' leading radio advertising agencies, were employed to handle the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s campaign. Ayer continued to handle all the company's other advertising. The advertising was incorporated into a weekly radio programme which was broadcast over 63 CBS Stations. 'Hawaiian Bound' featured the radio and stage comedian Phil Baker. David Kaonohi, a native Hawaiian steel guitarist, also performed on the program each week as ‘Johnny Pineapple’. The series of programs began in January 1939. Phil Baker was subsequently replaced by Al Pearce as the star of the show. The radio program was discontinued in April 1940, although the company claimed it had been a success.\footnote{University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings February 28, 1929 to December 23, 1932 and Stockholders’ Meetings February 28, 1929 to March 13, 1932, p.226; University of Hawaii at Manoa, Dole Corporate Archive, Minutes: Board of Directors, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, June 15, 1937 to August 29, 1939, pp.235, 239; Fox, op. cit., pp.150-62; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, November 23, 1938, p.17; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, November 25, 1938, p.14; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, December 6, 1938, p.15; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, January 11, 1939, p.3; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, January 13, 1939, p.2; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, January 16, 1939, p.2; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 29, 1940, p.17.} They argued that the ‘move is simply a revision of policy as far as media selection is concerned to fit the requirements of our business at this time’.\footnote{Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 29, 1940, p.17.}
Overall the advertising campaign was successful. Sales of Dole pineapple juice increased quickly in the 1930s. The demand for Dole pineapple juice created a big market for the company's other products by their brand name, even although the other products had not been given any real advertising support. According to Havighorst, what had been a completely miscellaneous and private brand label business became by a substantial margin, a Dole brand business, and without harming the company's relationships with its wholesalers and retailers. The latter began selling Dole brand pineapple products, because they found it easier than selling the same product under their own private brand labels.\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Monthly Retail Prices of No.2.5 Cans of Pineapples and Peaches, 1934-41}
\end{figure}

Series 1 = Canned Pineapple  
Series 2 = Canned Peaches  


\textsuperscript{42} Havighorst, \textit{op cit}, p.870.
The industry believed that advertising helped account for the revival in the demand for its product during the remainder of the 1930s and the creation of a market for a new product, canned pineapple juice. This is certainly supported by the experience of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. The company’s average net operating profits were substantially higher than those of the second half of the 1920s in the period 1935 to 1942. Although the records of Libby's Hawaiian Division have been destroyed and those of California Packing Corporation's Hawaiian Division are not available, there is every reason to believe that the other major companies' pineapple businesses were as successful as the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in the second half of the 1930s.

The advertising appears to have had a major influence on the revival of canned pineapple sales and the success of the industry's new product, pineapple juice. Figure 4 shows that the retail price of canned pineapple showed greater stability than that of canned peaches between 1934 and 1941. Although cheaper imported canned pineapple was available in the marketplace American consumers, even with reduced purchasing power, continued to purchase the more expensive Hawaiian product. The advertising continued to persuade them that the Hawaiian product was of higher quality, which for the most part it was.

It is also clear that the fantasy image of Hawaii created by the advertisers was very appealing to the consumers of the continental United States during the Great

Depression. It is clear that the advertisements often bore very little relationship to reality, particularly those making use of images of carefree native Hawaiians. As the notorious Massie Rape Case in the early 1930s showed, in reality native Hawaiians were a disadvantaged minority in Hawaii. Diseases brought to their islands by outsiders in the aftermath of Captain Cook’s rediscovery of Hawaii in 1778 had decimated them. The majority of the survivors had been reduced to penury by the globalisation of the Hawaiian economy.

There were two other factors that explain the success of the industry. First, the PPCA created the stability so sadly lacking in the Californian fruit industry. Second, the remarkably successful introduction of pineapple juice to the American market made a significant contribution to the industry's recovery during the Great Depression. The pineapple industry's great success was achieved despite the fact that continental American agriculture was suffering probably the worst depression in its history.

However, on the eve of the Pacific War there ominous signs that suggested that Hawaii’s domination of the American market for canned pineapple might be coming to an end. In December 1940 it was reported that Mexican pineapple was being imported into the United States and being converted into low-price juice by a Texan cannery. The California Packing Corporation’s pineapple acreage in the Philippines, where it had established a pineapple plantation and cannery subsidiary in the late 1920s, had been increased to the point where output could reach 1 million cases. The production of Taiwanese canned pineapple had been increased and the flavour

1934, p.765; Vol.147, No.1, September 13, 1938, p.1489; Vol.154, No.2, October 4,
improved. Almost all of Hawaii’s foreign competitors had the advantage of cheap labour because of lower living standards.\textsuperscript{44}