

DRAFT

Daniele Andreozzi

*Practices, merchants and mercantilism. The Jews and the wheat trade in Trieste between Eastern Europe, the Po, and the Mediterranean (18th century)*¹

Already in the seventeenth century, Trieste, Hapsburg port on the Adriatic, was a market of grain supply for the cities of the Italian Po Valley, for example Bologna, which addressed Trieste for their needs in situations of scarcity in north and central Italy. In the port of Trieste wheat came from other climatic and geographical areas, in particular from continental and eastern Europe: Styria, Carinthia, Hungary, the Balkans. The intermediary position of Trieste made this role possible. The city, although in itself lacking cereal, was a hub of communication between the different climatic and geographical areas and between the sea and the land (the Continent and the Mediterranean). This allowed him to exploit the different harvest times, the different qualities and the differences in prices produced by these factors. In addition, grain trade was an element of intense trade in food products and agricultural raw materials. Such trade was essential for the functioning of the port of Trieste. In the first half of the eighteenth century these products, and in particular oil, were essential to support the growth of Trieste. The mouths of the Po river and in particular Goro, a natural port formed by the backwash of the sea, were a fundamental junction in these circuits.

The Jewish merchants were protagonists of this trade. It was a long-term strategy concerning the Adriatic and Mediterranean routes and their contacts with the surrounding territories. In this area the weakening of the supremacy of Venice, the importance of the marinas of the medium and small Adriatic ports and the entrance on the scene of the Habsburgs created new scenarios and offered new opportunities. On the one hand the edicts of the free port issued, in 1717 and 1719, by Charles VI of Habsburg changed the role of Trieste, on the other the forces of the sea and the small and medium marinerias looked out over the city to test the possibility, becoming engine of the growth of the port.

Already in 1619 Pietro Contarini, *podestà* of Chioggia on behalf of the Republic of Venice, described the traffic of cereals, oil and salt that connected Puglia, the Papal State and Lombardy through Goro. He wrote that the duty of Ponte Lago Scuro, the

¹ This research was carried out within the framework of PRIN 2015NMSJAZ, Alla ricerca del "negoziante patriota". Mercantilismi, moralità economiche e mercanti dell'Europa mediterranea (secoli XVII-XIX), P.I. Biagio Salvemini

first at the mouth of the Po, in a few years had enriched its owner, the Genoese Giovanni Giorgio Costaguti, and he was the "main of all shops in the country." It was said that Costaguti had a wealth in cash of more than a million shields and had bought the nobility in Genoa paying 40,000 Spanish double.

In the years following the creation of the free port, Fortunato Cervelli seemed to follow this pattern. The Ferrara "neophyte" Cervelli was a multi-purpose businessman, merchant, financial, supplier of the imperial army, as well as a contractor for public duties. During an incredible career in which corruption diplomacy, embezzlement, crimes and violence, financial activities, businesses, smuggling, private interests and services to the Hapsburg were confusedly intertwined, accumulated a huge wealth, obtained the noble title and covered important careers in Hapsburg administration. His assets and business were concentrated in the Ferrara area. Here Cervelli was administrator of vast property land, landowner, interested in the conduct of the valleys of Comacchio and contractor of duties. It also held the duty of the Ferrara treasury that allowed the control of the duties of the entire province. His projects were based on previous ones, however, the entry into the Adriatic of the Habsburgs and the new centrality of Trieste opened up new scenarios.

Andrea Memo, general administrator of Palma for the Republic of Venice, effectively summarized the projects of Cervelli in the idea of "keeping the Po open, not furtively as it happened before, but with advertising". In fact, the Ferrarese had proposed in Vienna a fair system focused on Trieste and inserted in the Adriatic fair system focused on the fair of Senigallia as a tool to increase the traffic of this port. Charles VI of Habsburg accepted the plan. In reality, the project of Cervelli aimed to defend from the Venetian controls the pre-existing Adriatic circuits by placing them under the protection of the Hapsburg flag. In Fortunato's plans, this system was linked to the creation of a powerful commercial company that has branched into a large number of correspondents in the Adriatic and Mediterranean ports where merchants of various origins and religions were included. In such context the relationship with the pre-existing traffics connect those projects with the Jewish merchants. In these, and especially in those of products such as rice, cereals and oil, the Jewish merchants were, for a long time, protagonists. The Cervelli project was short-lived. The Trieste fair was held for 4 years from 1731 to 1734. The urgencies of the European wars, in fact, diverted the attention of the Habsburgs and the port of Trieste in their eyes became above all center from which to pass troops and supplies directed towards the front still above all on the axis linking the city to Goro and the Po. Not having the ships and the necessary work force and skills, again the Empire entrusted these tasks to the protagonists of the Adriatic traffic, even as regards the transport of cereals. Thus, the sea circuits and the members of these circuits, which had been located in Trieste, continued to support the growth of the city exploiting these opportunities and continuing to implement the previous practices and trade.

By mid-century, following such dynamics, a merchant class made up of people from different backgrounds (Italian Peninsula, Balkans, East, Continental Europe) and religion and cults (Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Orthodox) had settled in the city. This merchant class developed a common conscience, shared myths, and began to place the first barriers to entry into the square. To support its cosmopolitan characteristics, the cosmopolitan composition of the Mediterranean and Adriatic fluxes that were its foundation and the limited capitalization capacities that required to use every available resource. It was therefore a material cosmopolitanism resulting from practices rather than state policies. When, in the middle of the century, the Habsburg Empire returned to appear in Trieste, it recognized this class as a reference in the city government. The result of this was the gathering of the merchant class in the stock exchange. Many of these were Jewish merchants who arrived in the first half of the century. As it appears from the studies of Carlo Gatti, the provenance and marriage market in which they were inserted testifies to the proximity to the areas most involved in the traffic of cereals that included Trieste: Ancona, Ferrara, Mantua, Gorizia and Gradisca. In addition, for some of them the sources specify the particular interest in grain trade. For example, Giuseppe and Emanuele Pincherle, arriving from Gorizia in 1745 and in 1747, whose main activity was that of merchants of grains and Levi Coliman, who came from Modena in 1748 and was listed as a cereal merchant. These were flanked by other major Jewish merchants whose specific interest in grain trafficking is not indicated due to the wide range of their interests, such as Ventura Morpurgo and Grassini Vita Levi, and to some sensible "licensed" Jews 'brokers': Isach Treves from Gorizia, Isach Levi from Trieste, Abram Port from Ferrara and Vita Levi from Modena. Then there was the strong involvement in oil trade; already in 1732 the Jewish merchants were absolute protagonists of this traffic and the company Morpurgo-Levi stood out for importance.

Regarding this, however, we must underline some specific features of the situation in Trieste resulting of the material cosmopolitanism that characterized it: the lack of signs of distinction and the permeability of the ghetto were proof of this. Jewish merchants worked similarly to their colleagues belonging to other religions. The Jewish merchants formed companies with the other merchants, participated in major business ventures, owned real estate, and were members of the merchant stock exchange. If they used the chains of own trust and knowledge, the religious and family ones, they did not disdain to exploit the others chains and the opportunities that such chains opened. The practices implemented by Jewish merchants in the cereals trade do not seem particularly different from those implemented by the other Triestine merchants involving in such trades, as, for example, Michiel Angelo Zois, from Bergamo, and the Ferrarese Rocci and Balletti.

For example, in the second half of the 1750s, the Jewish merchants Ventura Morpurgo, Grassin Vita Levi and the Luzzati brothers, from Gorizia but residing in Trieste,

entered the company that had the right to produce and sell bread in Trieste. The company also replaced the role previously held by the “Fondaco del pane” which was supposed to guarantee the stocks and supply of the city's cereals. Moreover, beyond the 'official' appearances, the company allowed to trade cereals in the Adriatic circuits, avoiding, duties and limitations. Other merchants - Catholics and, perhaps, Protestants and among the most important merchants in Trieste - took part in the company and even some of the main members of the peripheral Hapsburg bureaucracy dealt with it. Moreover, for years, around the company's existence, the main investments and the economic fortunes of the city were interwoven in the context of a violent clash between two clientelistic business groups linking Trieste at the court of Vienna.

Just around the fifties, however, in parallel to this conflict, the grain trade was affected by an evolution that profoundly changed the situation. In the middle of the century, the Venetian spies who controlled the growth of Trieste described the cereal trades as discontinuous and dependent on the conjunctures and, therefore, significant but in any case not decisive for the life of the port. However, this description soon became out of date.

To strengthen the border with the Ottoman Empire, the Viennese court decided to populate the Banat of Temeswar with settlers aiming to build a peasant militia responsible for border defense. The important house of Perlas was influential in such area. They also had land holdings in the area and from the beginning of the eighteenth century devised development projects. To fund this militia it was decided to support cereal and other agricultural products trade through Trieste. The Court of Vienna undertook to improve the routes that put the Banat in communication with Trieste by financing works for both land and river, the Sava and Culpa, roads. In addition, it guaranteed important subsidies to those who had marketed cereals through the port of Trieste, offering a cash prize for grain marketed.

From this moment on, grain traffic became increasingly important. It was based on the marketing of cereals from Stiria, Carinthia, Cragno and Banato, on the one hand, and on the other from the Italian peninsula, from the Levante, from Morea, from the coasts of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Then, starting from these, the function of Trieste became more complex and it was not limited to linking east Europe with Po Valley. Trieste became a pivot of very complex mechanisms that involved two larger geographical areas. We can roughly divide these areas in Ponente and Levante, including East and Continental Europe, Levant, Mediterranean seas and reaching the Ocean and the Americas. So, Trieste inserted itself in the conjunctures that characterized the prevailing axes of cereal traffic.

From the Trieste point of view, cereals entered in the Mediterranean circuits coming from Styria, Carinthia, Hungary, Banat of Temeswar (by the way of Trieste and Danube and Black Sea), Balkans, Morea, Ottoman Empire, North Africa, Sicily, Italian

Peninsula, Po, France (both from the Atlantic ports like Bordeaux, both from the Mediterranean port like Marseille), and England. However, these flows were neither constant nor single directional. There were continuity and vocations, but they were never taken for granted. Some routes and directions were more relevant but, at the same time, they were subject to frequent and sudden changes. It is possible to identify some neuralgic junctions and some key areas with specific tasks. However, such these tasks were always fluid and interchangeable. In the circuits involving Trieste such areas and hubs were Continental and East Europe, Ottoman Empire, Morea, Trieste, Goro, Ancona, Po Valley, Central-Southern Italian Peninsula, Balkans, Malta, Sicily, Africa with Tunis and Algiers, Livorno, Genoa, Marseilles, Iberian Peninsula, France, Cadiz, Lisbon, England, London, Portsmouth, the Americas. This rough description only serves to give an idea of involved areas. However, it does not provide an exhaustive description of them.

Then during the second half of the 18th century, in addition to relations with Continental Europe and the Levant, the Iberian Peninsula, Cadiz, Lisbon, Genoa, the Italian Peninsula (the Kingdom of Naples and the Papal State, but also the Val Padana), and the Americas were privileged export markets. For example, because of the American War of Independence, the grain became one of the main traded good in Trieste. Such trade reached the annual value of four million florins and the wheat that the Turkey Company, the privileged English company that ran the trade with the Ottoman Empire, marketed in peacetime moved to Trieste under the imperial flag.

Moreover, in those decades the trade of cereals gained further importance not only for its value in themselves, but for the role it assumed in the mechanisms of the functioning of the port. As the Habsburg officials wrote, in the free port of Trieste cereals were essential to attract ships that made the port rich in merchandise. Moreover, being well received as reloading goods, cereals allowed not to use money in exchanges keeping the precious metal inside the imperial borders. The cereals were easy to sell because of the ease of placement on the markets and the usefulness for navigation purposes. In fact, trips made with empty holds were on the one hand extremely expensive, on the other dangerous. The cereals, being heavy goods, were extremely functional also because the loads had to be evaluated in their overall composition. This made trade profitable even in the case of ships carrying goods belonging to several merchants both because it guaranteed navigability, and because it contained costs, making travel possible.

Moreover, as in 1770 the economist Ferdinando Galiani wrote in *Dialogues sur le commerce du blé*, “les grands commerces portent en croupe les petits”. Wheat guaranteed the security and secrecy of the transport of goods of low weight and of great value both with respect to the attacks of criminals, and with respect to the claims of regulation of the States. In Trieste, that was surrounded by dangerous seas and where

secrecy was important, this function also linked cereals trade to the trade of jewels and silver Thalers of Maria Teresa, which were one of the major dollar coins in the world and one of the main goods shipped to the Ottoman Empire. In Trieste many of the grain traders were connected to the trading of coins and jewels, as Johan Fries, the international firm Brentano Cimaroli and Venino and Pasquale Ricci were the protagonists of grain trade and that of thalers.

These developments led to an increase in the complexity of grain trade and a change in its protagonists and in the practices that characterized it. Important international companies, such as the aforementioned Brentano, Cimaroli and Venino, of Genoese origin, or the financial commercial group of the Proli of Antwerp, that engaged above all in the traffic of cereals from Central Europe to the Americas by the way of Trieste, dealt with it. In addition, several privileged companies, that were dedicated to this traffic, arose; for example The Privileged Company of Temeswar, that was linked to prominent members of the Vienna Court and Habsburg aristocracy, and the Janoschaza Company, which was linked to nobles and Hungarian landowners. For example, in 1767 there were at least four companies active in the trade of cereal. Prominent members of the Habsburg bureaucracy allocated in Trieste, as Pasquale Ricci and the barons Lopresti and Raab, members of the nobility and landowners of Graz, Banat and Hungary, members of the Viennese financial circles such as Johann Fries, all they dealt with them more or less unofficially. Each company had close ties, even of patronage, with the court of Vienna and represented precise territorial interests. In 1767, for example, these companies had sold 280,000 staia of wheat from Hungary, Croatia, Styria and Carinthia.

This on the one hand caused strong contrasts. The merchants located in Trieste tried to impede the entry into the square to the companies directed predominantly by external interests and at the same time to prevent the direct and 'official' participation of the Hapsburg officials to the trade, especially those not organic to them. On the other hand, the relations with the court and the Hapsburg administration became a fundamental strategic resource and the size of the companies dedicated to these trades grew. In addition, these companies and large international companies such as the Brentano Cimaroli and the Proli intertwined relationships, albeit in a variable way, with the merchants active in Trieste.

The traffics managed by individual merchants, even small and medium ones, continued, but these assumed above all an intermediary role between the companies and the supply and outlet markets. This also happens for Jewish merchants interested in such trade. In fact, immediately, these tried to take advantage of new opportunities. As we have seen, some of them were members of the Company del 'Pane venale', which was the first to establish relations with the Banat focusing on the grain trade and in the early 60s the company Morpurgo and Levi imported wheat from Styria. In 1767,

however, Monasse and Isaac Morpurgo, together with the merchants from Trieste and Belusco and Rossetti, were directors of the company that referred to Johan Fries. On the other hand, the enlargement of the interests towards continental Europe and these areas of cereal production is reflected in the enlargement of the marriage market of the Trieste Jews to Hungary, as highlighted by Carlo Gatti in his studies on the Jews in Trieste. Jewish merchants continued their grain trades; nevertheless they specialized in a role of intermediation between the production areas and the outlet markets and those (Habsburg bureaucracy, great nobility, members of the international financial circuits) had privileged relations with the Court of Vienna and the imperial administration and controlled all trade circuits.

These trends emerged clearly in 1763-4, when a risky commercial financial project, that was started in Trieste by Pasquale Ricci, Giuseppe Henzel de Gramont, consul of the Kingdom of Naples in Trieste, and supported by the company Brentano Cimaroli, was one of the main causes of the famine that hit Naples in that year. As mentioned, the years 1758-1764 were central years for the economic development of Trieste and cereals trade. Cereals, in their commingling with the thaler trade and financial markets, took on new and fundamental dimensions and complexities for the functioning mechanisms of the port. Cereals became one of the main commodities traded through it. In addition, new relations were added to those relating to the supply of armies and closely linked this trade to state policies and the world of Hapsburg administration. .

Furthermore, in Trieste, the competition that arose around the grain trade was one of the determining factors both in the competition that arose within the city between the different business-clientelar groups that fought for the domination of the city economic system, and in the competition existing with localized interests in other areas of the Empire. The results of these competitions were also decisive in defining the practices implemented by the merchants located in the city.

Beginning in 1763, Ricci and Henzel devised a complex mechanism based, on the one hand, on the purchase contract of 30,000 *staia*² of wheat in the Banat and the predictions of an abundant harvest in Styria and Carinthia. On the other hand, it was based on the expected Mediterranean scarcity and the purchase orders entrusted to them by Bernardo Tanucci for the Kingdom of Naples. Tanucci was Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Naples and at that time one of the main members of the King's Council of Regence, the 13 year old Ferdinando I of Bourbon.

² In Trieste for the cereals, the Venetian measuring units were used: 1 staio = 83.3172 liters = 63 kilograms

Substantially, Henzel and Ricci, strong of some bills issued in their favor by Tanucci and of the charge to buy cereals without precise price limitations, tried to act as monopolists of all the cereals that arrived in Trieste. Then they did not put the cereals to Naples and, to take advantage of the high prices, sold grains to other merchants and States.

The collapse of the mechanism created was one of the main causes of the famine that struck Naples in 1764. But we will deal with this affair only to highlight the role of Jewish merchants in the grain trade at this crucial moment. They played the figure of sensals, such as Treves, who estimated the prices of current cereals on the square then used by Ricci and Henzel to build their castle, and, above all, they were merchants.

At the beginning of December 1763 Henzel and Ricci turned to Tanucci, proposing to entrust them with the supply of cereals to the city of Naples at the source of the threats of scarcity due to the bad harvest. The two guaranteed the flow of grains from the Carso, Cragno and Styria at the price of L. 24 a *staia* and from 'Polesine' and 'Padovano' to L. 13. The proposal was accepted. On 20 December, 40,000 *staia* were ordered and Tanucci personally signed the bills necessary to finance the start of the business. The plans of Ricci and Henzel were based on the control of some strategic resources. Such resources were the relations with the courts and the bureaucracy of Vienna and Naples, the administrative control of Trieste and the purchase agreement concerning the wheat what was produced in the Banato of Temsoar to finance the territorial militia defending that border. Moreover, they could count on the close relationship with the company Brentano Cimaroli and in particular with its director in Trieste, Giosuè Bianchi. This relationship also guaranteed them relations with the Vienna financial circuits.

In a short time, however, the two encountered considerable difficulties in meeting their commitment. At the end of February, only 9000 *staia* of wheat had been shipped to Naples. In the persistence of such difficulties, Henzel invoked every kind of excuse, claiming his own honor and patriotism. However, despite everything, Tanucci continued to refinance the console, continually expanding the mandate, both for prices and for quantities. The castle collapsed between April and May, when the new harvest was next. Tanucci suspended Henzel's mandate. The wheat, moreover of poor quality, continued to arrive in the city, despite the refusal of Tanucci to honor the bills. The piazza of Trieste risked bankruptcy and with it the Hapsburg branch of the Brentano Cimaroli. The relations between the two states risked crumbling and many processes were born that dragged on for many years. Henzel refused any responsibility, invoking any kind of excuse and claiming he had been hindered fraudulently. Many, like the

neutral Venetian spies in the affair, argued that the two had tried to obtain the monopoly of the grain trade, submitting to themselves the Trieste merchants involving in such trade. In the meantime, the two had used the contracts stipulated with the Kingdom and the Banat, to raise prices, selling the wheat to those who looked for in Trieste and not sending it to the Kingdom. Eventually the mechanism created had collapsed.

Here we will not discuss the analysis of this complex story. As already mentioned, we will use it to highlight the role of Jewish merchants. First of all, by obtaining the contract, Henzel and Ricci had succeeded in beating another consortium that usually dealt with the trafficking of cereals between Trieste and the Kingdom of Naples, which took place in the orbit of the State. Carmine Ventapane, "assentista generale" in the Kingdom of Naples and of which Alida Clemente wrote, was leader in Naples. In Trieste he had as a reference Bernardino Zois, who at the time was perhaps the most important merchant localized to Trieste and who divided his activity between this town and Ljubljana. In Naples, moreover, the merchant Cesare Ruggeri worked and in Trieste the "Christian" merchants Belusco and Rossetti and the Jews Grassin Vita Levi and Isaach Vita Levi were active. The traffic organized by this group passed through merchants, ports, ship and captains of the Apulian area. Ventapane and Zois acted as a sort of 'general contractor' that connected the actions of the other members aimed at the supply of cereals and that acted essentially as independent merchants. Ricci and Henzel wanted to replicate the same pattern.

When the first doubts about his work appeared in the Kingdom, Henzel accused this group of spreading slander against him. In particular, Isach Vita Levi had sent some samples of grains marketed by the Consul to prove their poor quality. In addition, Henzel claimed that Trieste Belusco and Rossetti, Grassin Vita Levi and always Isach Vita Levi hindered his attempts to buy cereals. Furthermore, the Consul accused the Jewish merchants of altering wheat prices.

Henzel's version is certainly tendentious and untruthful. However, it must have been credible. So, in some way, it reveals the importance, the practices and the role of Jewish merchants in these businesses.

According to Henzel, price alteration was the result of attempts by Jewish merchants to buy grains in Styria, Carinthia and Hungary regardless of price. This prevented Henzel from having them at the agreed price of 22 lire. Above all, however, the consul was worried about the competition that risked blocking its monopolistic aims both on the outlet markets and in the production areas. In February, Marco Levi had contacted Ventapane to explore the possibility of supplying Naples directly, bypassing the Consul's mediation. Henzel had turned to the president of Commercial Intendence advertising to get that traffic was forbidden, but in the game of internal balances to the Habsburg bureaucracy, his requests had been rejected because the president had listened to some 'tips' who had convinced him that for the State "price alteration" was

convenient "and that attracted more money". On the sidelines, in a polemical tone, the Consul added that this decision showed that the President had "the Jews at heart". In the clashes that had characterized Trieste this was not a neutral insinuation. Besides, it was not Henzel's only concern.

Grassin Vita Levi had made deal for the supply of Florence, where, in March, he was sending 6000 grain of wheat. He also agreed to send 12,000 *staia* of cereals from Carinthia to the Papal States, to Rome and Ancona. Above all, again in February, the Commander of Croatia 'military', fearing famine, had turned to Trieste, looking for 100,000 *staia* of wheat. Marco Levi, associated with others, had taken over the task, pushing up the price and, according to Henzel, trying to "pull all the grain into ghetto". Against this, the Commander had turned to Vienna to stop the export of cereals by the way of the port. In response, the Consul informed the Ambassador of the Kingdom at the Habsburg court to get to work to avert the provision, also warning him about the ability of Jewish merchants to influence with corruption the decisions that were taken there.

This was the moment of greater tension between Henzel and the Jewish merchants, even if the possibility that in reality there was already some form of collaboration between them is not to be excluded. What is certain is that from the end of February the situation changed. On the 29th of that month, Henzel warned Tanucci that the Rijeka warehouses would start to fill up with grain coming from Hungary and Croatia had suspended the ongoing orders with the Trieste merchants. Perhaps because of the lack of this possibility, perhaps as a result of the pressure put in place by Ricci, Henzel and their allies, perhaps following the promise to take on the purchase of all the grains at prices that make the thing attractive, in March, in a matter of days, relations between Henzel and Jewish merchants changed completely.

Levi denied having had any contact with Ventapane and assured that he would not be close to it in the future. Isach Vita Levi ceded to Henzel the 2000 *staia* of wheat he had stored in Trieste and promised to give him another 5000 *staia* waiting from Carinthia and 5000 from Polesine. Grassin Vita Levi assured that, in sending the wheat to Florence, he had given secret instructions to the captain of the ship to land in a port of the Kingdom, allowing the authorities to seize them, if they had paid him a price of 29 lire a *staio*. Those directed to Rome (it must have been 2000/3000 *staia*, but, given the ambiguity of Henzel, could also be 10-12,000) were instead sent with the agreement of the Consul who said he did not want to starve Rome. Vita Levi, however, promised that in the future the wheat that arrived on his behalf from Styria and Carinthia would be divided into two parts: one for Rome, one for Henzel.

Even the "christians" Belusco and Rossetti diminished their "pride" and gave Henzel the 300 *staia* of wheat they had in the city.

In those days Henzel also signed a contract with Grassini Vita Levi who undertook to deliver them 6000 *staia* of Hungarian wheat and of good quality "merchant" (1000 immediately, 1000 in April, 2000 in May and 2000 in June) at a price of 45 lire for *staio*. The contract was guaranteed with bills issued by Brentano Cimaroli on the Venice for a value of 33,000 lire. The total cost of wheat was set at 139,000 lire. Moreover, on the 28th of that month, with the 'official' mediation of Ricci, Henzel signed a further contract with Iacob Alpron for 12,000 *staia* to be delivered by the end of June. The advance payment was 24,000 florins.

I am not yet able to give the exact data of the grains for which contracts had been concluded and those actually sent. A still provisional balance makes it possible to estimate the wheat that Brentano Cimaroli had pledged to find in 26,000 *staia*. Instead, the grains actually shipped to Naples from Henzel thanks to Jewish merchants were probably 8598 *staia* for a value of about 340,000 lire. 1020 *staia* were in the name of Isach Vita Levi and 1128 of Marco Levi. 6400 *staia*, however, were the result of the work of the Jewish merchant Pincherle who probably collaborated with Henzel until the beginning of the project.

After the castle's collapse, the relationship between Henzel and the Jews also merged into the enormous cauldron of the trial. Grassin Vita Levi turned to the courts to get a refund of 26,313 lire for the damages suffered, giving the responsibility to Henzel as a representative of the Kingdom of Naples. The authorities of the Kingdom, however, moved to obtain copies of the contracts that linked Alpron to Brentano Cimaroli, holding that company responsible in the last resort for the work of the merchant. So the wheat harvested by the latter had to be merged into the 26,000 *staia* owned by Brentano Cimaroli. Only a contract signed by Alpron was not one of these. The one stipulated with the merchant Coen Felice Vitali of Ferrara for 4500 *staia*. The contract was not successful and in turn gave rise to a lawsuit that was being debated before the court in Graz.